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UTAH, 
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BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Case No. 14692 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an original proceeding upon a Writ of Certiorari 
to review an Order of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
The Public Service Commission dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction with prejudice the Complaint of the City of St. 
George after finding there is a present and future public con-
venience and necessity to be satisfied and concluding that its 
prior Order did not limit Dixie REA to serving only existing 
customers, but to the contrary, obligated Dixie REA to serve all 
customers, present or future coming into the area. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner here seeks an Order of this Court reversing 
the Order of the Public Service Commission, or, in the alternative,-
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I 
an Order declaring so much of the Order as increases the rights 
of Dixie REA of no force and effect. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The City of St. George owns and operates an electric 
i 
distribution system through which it provides electric service to 
the residents of the City. Over the past several years the City 
has annexed several parcels of land contiguous to its city limits 
and has extended its electrical distribution system into the 
annexed areas to provide electric service to the residents 
thereof. (R. 45, 46, 47.) 
A part of the area annexed by the City of St. George is 
also included in the area described in the Order of the Public 
Service Commission In Dixie REA Case No. 5663. (R. 46-48, ^ 
Exhibit 2 below.) Dixie REA and the City of St. George each 
presently service some customers within the area and each seeks 
to extend their lines to serve future customers. (R. 48.) The f 
extension of electrical distribution facilities by both Dixie REA 
and the City of St. George into the same area results in the 
duplication of systems. (R. 83, 84.) 41 
Dixie REA is a rural electric cooperative nonprofit 
corporation, distributing electric power and energy in certain 
areas in Washington County to its members and patrons and is an ^ 
electric corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion. (R. 100-112, 113.) 
By 1965 amendments to § 54-4-25, Utah Code Annotated, * 
1953 rural electric cooperatives like Dixie REA were made subject 
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to the Public Service Commissions jurisdiction and were required 
to seek from the Public Service Commission certificates of 
convenience and necessity* The 1965 amendments broadened the 
definition of electrical corporations to include cooperatives 
serving only their members and added subsections 4 and 5 to 
54-4-25. 
The 1965 amendments to the Public Utility Act placed 
electric cooperatives on equal footing with other electric utilities 
and required they seek certificates of convenience and necessity. 
Cooperatives other than those applying for a certificate to serve 
only customers served on the effective date of the amendments to 
the Act had to prove that they were financially capable and that 
the public convenience and necessity required their service. 
In 1965, Dixie Rural Electric Association filed with 
the Utah Public Service Commission an application for a Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity to operate as a public utility 
in an area of Washington County. The Order of the Commission 
upon the application in case No. 5663 is at R. 311. The Public 
Service Commission, in Case No. 5663 by Order dated June 30, 
1966, found: 
"The Commission finds that the evidence in this record 
does not justify the granting of a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity as requested. This finding 
is predicated on the lack of proof of the need or 
requirement of electric service in that part of the 
proposed service area outside of the old basic area, 
and the Berry Springs area, and the unsatisfactory debt 
ratio of Dixie." 
From its findings the Commission concluded: 
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"From the foregoing findings the Commission concludes 
that the application of Dixie REA for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity as set forth in the applica- 1^ 
tion and as modified and amended on this record should 
be denied. [Emphasis added.] 
The Commission further concludes that Dixie has a 
statutory right and has lawfully assumed the utility 
obligations to serve its customers in its old basic ' 
area and in the area described as Berry Springs Ex-
tension Area or Dixie's New Area, and that for clarity 
and definiteness, said area should be described in 
certificate form with a certificate number by meets and 
bounds as set forth in the findings above. 4 
From its findings and conclusions, the Commission ordered: 
"That the application of Dixie REA for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity to operate as a public utility 
rendering electric service in that part of Washington 4 
County as set forth in the applications and attachments 
thereto, and said area that is amended on this record 
be and the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Dixie Rural 
Electric Association has a statutory right and has 4 
lawfully assumed the utility obligations to serve its 
customers in the area described as the Berry Springs 
Area or Dixie's New Area, and for clarity and definite-
ness, Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1556 
is hereby issued to Dixie Rural Electric Association to 
operate as a public utility rendering electric service • 
in an area in Washington County delineated below." 
A part of the territory described in this Order of the 
Commission was contiguous to the City of St. George, has now been 
annexed, and is now served by the City of St. George with electric 
power. (R. 45-48.) Because of the resulting duplication the 
City sought from the Public Service Commission an Order directing 
Dixie REA to cease and desist from extending its facilities 
without first obtaining a certificate from the Commission and a 
franchise from the City. (R. 49, 51, 84.) 
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Within the limits of the City of St. George, Dixie REA 
presently serves more than 10 but less than 20 customers. These 
customers include feed yards, corrals, nomes and naif a dozen or 
so pumps. (R. 136-137.) 
Dixie has no franchise from the City of St. George. 
(R. 105.) Dixie had a franchise from Washington County that 
authorized use of the public highways outside of the incorporated 
limits of the cities and towns in Washington County. That franchiset 
dated June 11, 194 6, expired by its terms June 11, 197 6. (R. 105, 
R. 332.) 
Dixie REA holds itself out to provide electric service 
to the residents of the annexed areas of the city who are also 
within the area described in the Order of the Commission in Dixie 
REA in Case No. 5663. (R. 112.) Dixie REA will, unless otherwise 
ordered by the Public Service Commission, continue to extend its 
services within the area. 
Following hearing upon the complaint of the City the 
Commission found (R. 254): 
The Commission finds as to issue No. 2 that Dixie 
REA was granted a certificate of convenience and 
necessity No. 1556 on June 30, 1966, Exhibit 14. The 
area granted to Dixie REA described in metes and bounds 
and generally covered that portion of Washington County 
surrounding the City of St. George as the city bound-
aries then existent. The certified area includes two 
areas described as "the old area" and the "Berry Springs 
area." 
Dixie had assumed its responsibilities as a public 
utility under the appropriate section of the statute 
enacted in 1965, and was serving all customers coming 
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i 
into said areas. At that time, there were about 45 
customers, but over the years since 1966 as additional 
customers have moved into the area and sought service ' 1^ 
Dixie has also served them until in 1975 the customers 
totaled 43 9, In reliance on the certificate Dixie has 
expanded its facilities to serve the entire area, 
increased its plant investment from $129,530.69 in 1967 
to $1,800,699.00 in 1975 and increasing its kilowatt 
hour usage from 628,722 in 1967 to 12,714,950 in 1975. •' 
. . . From 1966 to present, Dixie's financial 
condition has steadily and substantially improved as is 
shown by the association's F and S records, Exhibit 9. 
This Commission in March, 197 6, in a proceeding wherein * 
Dixie an increase to its certificated area found that 
Dixie had sufficient stability and power sources to 
justify the added area certificate and the Commission 
reaffirmed its prior findings that Dixie was operating 
within an area of certificate serving all customers 
coming into the area. | 
Dixie has since 1966 conducted its operations in 
reliance upon the right and obligation to serve all 
customers coming into the area and has done so without 
opposition from any customer from the City of St. George 
or from this Commission. During this period Dixie has 4 
borrowed $1/500,000.00 from the REA with the approval 
of this Commission , . . Dixie has served all customers 
seeking service and continues to serve the public 
seeking service throughout the entire area. 
The evidence shows that less than a dozen customers • 
have been served in the overlap area by the City of 
St. George, but in all instances these customers were 
already being served by Dixie and were disconnected by 
the City or went to the City and did not seek service 
from Dixie. There is no evidence to show that Dixie 
has failed or refused to serve all seeking service from * 
the area, in fact Dixie in filing its lawsuits in 
Washington County has sought to protect its area and to 
prevent the City from serving customers from within the 
area certified to Dixie. 
Testimony indicated some duplication of facilities, 
but the Commission finds that these resulted from the 
efforts of the City of St. George in constructing lines 
and in serving customers in the certified area which 
was already being adequately served by Dixie. The 
Commission finds it has no authority to prevent 0 
St. George from effecting said duplication of facilities 
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even though such duplication is obviously wasteful and 
contrary to the public convenience and necessity. 
The Commission finds that the Dixie certificates 
of convenience and necessity including No, 155 6 and the 
two supplements thereto, Exhibit 18 and Exhibit 22, 
clearly do not limit Dixie to serving existing customers, 
but in fact to the contrary obligate Dixie to serve all 
customers both present and future coming into the area 
described in said certificate and needing electric 
service. 
• • . . 
The Commission further finds that Dixie has clearly 
and completely fulfilled its utility obligations under 
its certificates in serving the area and all customers 
coming into said area and that Dixie is ready, willing 
and fully capable of so serving all future customers in 
accordance with its certificate and appropriate statutory 
requirements. . . . The Commission finds as to issue 
No. 2 that Dixie does have a proper certificate of 
convenience and necessity authorizing it to serve new 
and additional customers within the limits of the City 
within its certified area described in Dixie's certificate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
. . . The Commission further concludes that 
Dixie's certificate No. 1556 granted in 1966 as it has 
been increased area wise, authorized Dixie to serve all 
customers both present and future coming into the 
certified area and that Dixie over the years has fully 
fulfilled its obligation under proper and adequate 
financing, under the proper franchise and with adequate 
power and facilities and that Dixie is ready, willing 
and capable of doing so in the future. The Commission 
further finds that there is a present and future public 
convenience and necessity to be satisfied within Dixie's 
certified area, and that notwithstanding the overlap of 
the City's annexed area, there is no factual or legal 
reason for this Commission to curtail Dixie's certifi-
cate or its operation with Dixie's certified area and 
specifically within the annexed area overlapping into 
Dixie's certificate area. The Commission concludes 
that the complaint of St. George City should be dismissed. 
The Commission is aware of the basic conflicts 
between the parties evident in the Washington County 
litigation, but concludes that it has no jurisdiction 
or authority to resolve those many and complex issues. 
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i 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the i 
complaint of St. George City in this matter is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
I. ARGUMENTS 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS UPON * 
THE SCOPE OF THE AUTHORITY OF DIXIE REA WHEN DISMISSING 
FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION ARE IMPROPER. 
The Commission's Order here under review concludes: * 
The Commission concludes that the complaint of the 
City of St. George should be dismissed. 
The Commission is aware of the basic conflict | 
between the parties evident in the Washington County 
litigation, but concludes that it has no jurisdiction 
or authority to resolve those many and complex issues. 
[Emphasis ours.] 
In spite of its disposition of this case because of a lack of 4 
authority or jurisdiction to resolve the matters involved, the 
Commission found that 
"Dixie REA's certificates of convenience and • 
necessity . . . do not limit Dixie to serving its 
existing customers, but in fact, to the contrary, 
clearly obligated Dixie to serve all customers, both 
present and future coming into the area described in 
its certificates and needing electric service there. 
and concluded 
. . . that Dixie's certificate No. 1556 granted in 
1966 . . . authorized Dixie to serve all customers, 
both present and future coming into its certified area. ^ 
• • • 
and 
That there is a present and future public convenience 
and necessity to be satisfied. 
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Neither these findings or conclusions with respect to 
the scope of the authority of Dixie REA were necessary to the 
disposition of this matter if the Commission was without jurisdic-
tion or authority to "resolve the many and complex issues involved." 
This Court has repeatedly instructed the Public Service 
Commission not to arrogate into the proceedings and pass upon 
matters which were not properly included and presented therein. 
Indeed, in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Empire Electric Association, 
25 Utah 2d 264, 480 P.2d 145 (1971) where the Commission purported 
to redefine the authority of a protestant this Court said: 
It was not within the duty or the prerogative of 
the Commission to arrogate into the proceedings and 
pass upon matters which were not properly included and 
presented therein. 
The Court proceeded to grant appropriate relief, stating: 
In conformity with this doctrine and upon the 
basis of the stipulation of the parties it is our 
judgment that the plaintiff should prevail to the 
extent that we make the following order: Insofar as 
the order of the Public Service Commission grants the 
application of Empire Electric Association to render 
service in accordance with the area described therein, 
the order is affirmed; but insofar as it may purport to 
go beyond the issue before it and limit or adversely 
affect any previously existing rights of Utah Power & 
Light Company to render in the rest of San Juan County, 
it is of no force and effect. 
In an earlier case, W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809 (1954), this Court held 
essentially the same saying: "Prichard's authority could not be 
augmented in this proceeding wherein he appeared only as a 
protestant." 
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< 
In Utah Gas Service Co, v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 18 
Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967) this Court similarly observed i 
that the safeguarding of the Commission's prerogatives and the 
public interest requires that the orders of the Commission be 
construed as passing only upon the issues before it. There the ' 
Court said: 
The safeguarding of the Commission's prerogatives 
and of the public interest requires that its orders be . 
construed as passing only upon the issues before it; 
. . . so that when its authority is properly invoked it 
may make such subsequent orders as the public interest 
may require. 
In the proceedings before the Commission here under j 
review Dixie REA was a respondent. The City complained Dixie was 
acting in violation of the law, i.e., without authority from the 
Commission. The Commission dismissed the complaint of the City | 
of St. George for lack of jurisdiction. Under such circumstances, 
the Commission had no duty or prerogative to define the scope of 
Dixie's authority. If the Commission lacked jurisdiction to ! 
"resolve those many and complex issues" then its finding and 
conclusion on the scope of Dixie's authority ought be of no 
force and effect and must not stand. As we note below, not * 
only are these findings beyond the scope of the issue decided by 
the Commission, but also erroneous as a matter of law. 
We submit that where the Commission concludes it has no * 
authority or jurisdiction to resolve the issues in this matter, 
the Commission's findings and conclusions with respect to the 
I 
scope of the authority of Dixie REA and the need for such services 
must be of no force and effect. 
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ri. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW IN ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT THE 
DIXIE REA HAS THE RIGHT TO SERVE FUTURE CUSTOMERS 
IN THE AREA IN CONFLICT. 
Quite aside from the fact that the Commission1s findings 
and conclusions upon the scope of Dixie REA's authority was an 
improper arrogation, the findings and conclusion are erroneous as 
a matter of law. 
Nonprofit electric cooperatives serving only their 
members were not public utilities and not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Public Service Commission prior to the 1965 amendments 
to the Public Utility statutes. Garkane Power Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 98 Utah 466, 100 P.2d 571, 132 A.L.R. 1940 
(1940); San Miguel Power Association v. Public Service Commission, 
292 P.2d 511, 4 Utah 2d 252 (1956). Nonprofit electric cooperatives 
and associations were not public utilities because their service 
was to members only [consumer owners] and not to the public 
generally. Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
supra. 
By 1965 amendments to the Public Utility statutes, 
nonprofit electrical cooperative associations were made subject 
to the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction. The 1965 
amendments broaden the definition of "electric corporation" to 
include cooperative associations serving only their members. As 
a result thereof, cooperatives became subject to the prohibitions 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of 54-4-25(1) and were thenceforth required to have a certificate 
of convenience and necessity before beginning construction or \ 
operation of any plant or system. Construction or extension of 
an electrical plant, except under limited circumstances, required 
Commission authority. ^ 
The 1965 amendment also added subsections (4) and (5) 
to Section 54-4-25. Section 54-4-25(4) provides: 
Any supplier of electricity which is brought under 
the jurisdiction and regulation of the Public Service 
Commission by this Act may file with the Commission an 
application for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity giving the applicant the exclusive right to serve 
the customers it is serving in the area in which it is 4 
serving at the time of this filing, subject to the 
existing right of other electric corporations to likewise 
serve its customers in existence in said areas at said 
time. . . . a public hearing may be held to determine 
if said applicant has sufficient finances, equipment 
and plant to continue its existing service; and the | 
Commission shall issue its order within 45 days after 
such hearing according to the proof submitted at hearing. 
Every electric corporation save and except those 
applying for a certificate to serve only the customers 
served by the applicant on the effective date of this I 
act applying for such a certificate shall have estab-
lished a ratio of debt capital to equity capital or 
will within a reasonable period of time establish a 
ratio of debt capital to equity capital which the 
Commission shall find renders the electric corporation 
financially stable and which financing shall be found * 
to be in the public interest. [Emphasis ours.] 
These sections of 1965 amendments to the Public Utility 
Act authorize the Commission to issue grandfather kind of rights ^ 
to the electrical cooperative associations, i.e. : the right to 
serve only the customers (members) served on the effective date 
of the Act if the cooperative or association was financially 4 
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unstable and/or could not prove the public convenience and necessity 
required their service. 
In 1965 Dixie REA, a nonprofit electrical cooperative, 
applied to the Utah Public Service Cornmission for a certificate 
of convenience and necessity to operate as a public utility in 
certain areas of Washington County, although at the time Dixie's 
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws restricted its service to 
members only. The Commission found in the matter of the application 
of Dixie REAf case No. 5663, in its Order dated June 30, 1966, 
Exhibit 4 below at Record page 311 et seq, Record page 327: 
The Commission finds that the evidence in this 
record does not justify the granting of a certificate 
of convenience and necessity as requested. This finding 
is predicated on the lack of proof of the need or 
requirement for electric service in that part of the 
proposed service area outside the old service area and 
the Berry Springs area and the unsatisfactory debt 
ratio of Dixie. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Commission then 
concluded: 
From the foregoing Findings the Commission concludes 
that the application of Dixie Rural Electric Association 
for a certificate of convenience and necessity as set 
forth in the application and as modified and amended on 
the record should be denied. [Emphasis ours.] 
The Commission further concludes that Dixie has a 
statutory obligation and has assumed a utility obliga-
tion to serve its customers in its old basic area and 
in the area described as the Berry Springs extension 
area or Dixief s new area and that for clarity and 
definiteness, said area should be described in certifi-
cate form with a certificate number by metes and bounds 
as set forth in the following Findings. 
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From the foregoing Findings and Conclusions the Commission 
ordered: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the 
application of Dixie Rural Electric Association for a 
certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as 
a utility rendering electric service in that part of ( 
Washington County as set forth in the application and 
the attachments thereto, and said application as amended 
on the record be and the same is hereby denied• 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that Dixie 
Rural Electric Association has a statutory right and i 
has lawfully assumed the utility obligations to serve 
its customers in its old basic area and in the area 
described as the Berry Springs extension area or Dixie's 
new area, and for clarity and definiteness, certificate 
of convenience and necessity No. 1556 is hereby issued 
to Dixie REA to operate as a public utility rendering * 
electric service in an area in Washington County, 
delineated below. [Territorial descriptions omitted.] 
* * * * * 
In the Order here under review, the Commission found " 
that: 
. . . Dixie REA's certificates of convenience and 
necessities . . . do not limit Dixie to serving its | 
existing customers, but in fact, to the contrary, 
clearly obligate Dixie to serve all customers, both 
present and future coming into the area described in 
its certificates and needing electric service. 
and concluded: 4 
. . . That Dixiefs certificate No., 1556 granted 
in 1966 . . . authorized Dixie to serve all customers 
both present and future coming into its certificated 
area . .. . . 
and; 
. . . that there is a present and future public 
convenience and necessity to be satisfied . . . . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
We submit these findings and conclusions are in light of 54-4-
25(4) erroneous. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not been called 
upon to interpret Section 4 to Section 54-4-25, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) as amended, the statutory scheme of bringing electrical 
cooperatives under Public Service Commission jurisdiction is 
similar to that of Colorado. 
In Colorado nonprofit electric corporations and electrical 
cooperative associations providing electric service to their 
members were not utilities subject to the Public Utilities Commis-
sion jurisdiction. In 1960 one nonprofit cooperative corporation, 
Union Electric Association, Inc., seeing its territory invaded, 
complained to the Public Service Commission of the invasion of 
certificated utilities into what it believed was its service area 
and applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 
The Public Utilities Commission dismissed the complaint of Union 
and granted Union the authority to serve only its members and 
customers. The Colorado Supreme Court in Public Service Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission, 142 Colorado 135, 350 P.2d 543 
(1960) affirmed in part, saying with respect to the complaint: 
In view of the fact that Union had not, at the 
time it filed its complaint against Public Service, 
acquired public utility status, it was in no position 
to complain that Public Service was invading its 
service area, for, not being a public utility it had no 
service area. 
The Public Utilities Commission issued Union a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity to its members and customers in • 
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some areas and the Supreme Court affirmed in part the issuance of 
such certificate of convenience and necessity limited to serving 
members, saying the rural electric associations may not expect to 
have an area carved out for them and are entitled to a certificate 
only upon proof that public convenience and necessity requires 
i t . • 
In 1961 the Colorado legislature amended the Colorado 
Public Utility Laws to define public utilities to include every 
cooperative electric association or nonprofit electric corporation 
or association supplying electric energy to its members or to the 
public. As a result of the amendment, a number of applications 
were filed with the Public Utilities Commission by nonprofit 
electrical corporations and electrical cooperatives for certificates 
of convenience and necessity. The Colorado Supreme Court in 
Public Utilities Commission v. Home Light & Power Co., 163 
Colorado 72, 428 P.2d 928 (1967) ruled in part upon these applica-
tions. The Colorado Supreme Court said in part in affirming the 
certificates: 
We have already held that a rural electric associa-
tion may not expect to have a service area carved out * 
-,.,. for it from areas already certified to other utilities. 
Public Serv. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 142 Colo. 135, 
350 P.2d 543, cert, denied, 364 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct. 53, 
5 L.Ed.2d 50. In such areas "it must find its place 
from among the places that remain." In the instant * 
case, however, we are talking about "the places that 
remain." While Poudre Valley should properly be limited, 
to serving its then members and customers in prior 
certificated areas, yet, as to unserved and uncertifi-
cated areas it now stands on the same footing as any 
other public utility. 41 
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The court noted that this method used by the Public Utilities 
Commission was what may be called "freezing." Under this solution, 
the non-certified utility was upon being certificated limited to 
serving its existing customers on the line in question, absent 
proof that public convenience and necessity required more. All 
new customers were to be served by the certified utility. 
Thus, we see that the Colorado Public Utilities Commis-
sion was freezing the service of rural electric cooperatives to 
their existing customers when they were not entitled to a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity to serve the area. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in Western Colorado Power 
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 163 Colorado 61, 428 P.2d 922 
(1967) explained this statutory scheme and practice in another 
case involving yet another application by a rural electric 
cooperative, saying: 
We hold that the 1961 act of the legislature did 
not destroy the holding of this Court in Public Serv. 
Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 142 Colo. 135, 350 P.2d 543, 
cert, denied, 364 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct. 53, 5 L.Ed.2d 50. 
The effect of the 1961 act was prospectively to estab-
lish electrical co-operatives as public utilities and 
to give them a regulated monopoly status as of that 
date in those areas in which they were rendering service 
on an exclusive basis. The legislative act,, however, 
did not purport to affect the contractual rights between 
co-operatives and their members which were created at a 
time when the co-operatives did not enjoy the status 
of public utilities, and thus in the instant action 
Delta-Montrose may continue to serve all members who were 
receiving service prior to the effective date of its 
becoming a public utility, . . . [Emphasis ours.] 
Thus, we see the legislative scheme in Colorado in 
declaring electric cooperatives to be public utilities was to 
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preserve the contractual rights between the cooperatives and 
their members as they had historically existed and to freeze the 
service to existing members, absent evidence that the public 
convenience and necessity required more. 
The Utah legislative scheme appears to follow that of 
Colorado and was adopted while the Colorado courts were struggling 
with their Act. In Utah as in San Miguel Power Association v. 
i 
Public Service Commission, supra, this Court held, as Colorado 
was to hold later, cooperatives were not utilities and not entitled 
to resist the expansion of utilities. In Colorado, nonprofit 
electrical cooperatives were then brought under the jurisdiction 
of the Public Service Commission by the amendments to the Public 
Utility Act. Cooperatives were given the opportunity to acquire 
a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as a regulated 
monopoly serving an area to the exclusion of all other regulated 
utilities under Section (1) of Section 54-4-25, Utah Code Annotated, * 
and cooperatives not financially stable and/or able to prove the 
public convenience and necessity requires their service were 
granted the rights to serve their historic customers—members in 4 
respect of their existing contractual rights under Section (4) of 
54-4-25, Utah Code Annotated. 
We submit that the scope of Dixie's authority from the 41 
Commission's Order in case No. 5663 is clear on its face. Dixie's 
application was denied. The rights of Dixie REA under that Order 
are the rights to serve only its customers existing on the * 
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effective date of the Act and no others. The findings and con-
clusions of the Commission here under review that its Order in 
case No. 5663 did not limit Dixie to serving only existing 
customers are therefore as a matter of law erroneous and must 
not stand. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
RECEIVING AND CONSIDERING EVIDENCE OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT 
TO THEIR ORDER IN CASE NO. 5663 DATED JUNE, 1966 
IN INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF DIXIE'S AUTHORITY. 
The Order of which the petitioner here complains is 
replete with findings by the Commission of the conduct of Dixie 
REA since 1966. For example, the Commission found that Dixie1s 
customers had increased from 45 in 1966 to some 439; that Dixie's 
investment had increased from $129,500.00 to $1,800,000.00; that 
Dixie's financial condition has steadily and substantially 
improved and further that Dixie REA had conducted its operations 
upon reliance upon the right and obligations to serve all customers 
coming into the area. 
Clearly, the Commission has relied upon what Dixie REA 
had done since the Commission's Order in case No. 5663 to find 
the scope of Dixie's authority. What Dixie has done since 1966 
is neither relevant nor material to the interpretation of the 
Order of the Commission in case No. 5663. Yet the Commission 
over objection received: 
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Exhibit No, 7, R-pg. 356, a circuit diagram for 
the Dixie REA system as it existed in 1967. 
Exhibit No, 8, R-pg. 357, a circuit diagram for 
the Dixie REA system in 1967 with colored lines which 
depict the current scope of the Dixie system. 
Exhibit No. 9, R-pg. 358, a compilation of monthly 
reports of Dixie REA to the United States Rural Electri-
fication Administration for the years 1966 to 1975. 
These reports contain financial and statistical data. • 
Exhibit No. 10, R-pg. 377, a compilation of figures 
that allegedly show the growth of Dixie REA for the 
years 1966 to 1975. 
Exhibit No. 11, R-pg. 378, a compilation of figures 
that purports to represent the number of work orders 
for Dixie REA for the years 1967 to 1975. 
Exhibit No. 12, R-pg. 279, a compilation of figures 
that purports to express the Utah usage of the Dixie 
REA system for the years 1966 to 1975. 
The receipt of evidence of the events since 1966 and reliance 
i 
thereon to interpret Dixie's authority so diseases the Commission's 
consideration of this matter that one must conclude as a matter 
of law that it was error for the Commission to receive the evidence. 
The extent of the authority of Dixie must be found in 
the statute authorizing the Commission to Act and within the four 
corners of the Commission's Order. The rights thereunder must be 
such as are fairly understood from the import of its language. 
W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service Commission, 3 Utah 2d 277 P.2d 
809 (1954). The extent of the authority of Dixie REA ought not 
be found in the conduct of Dixie REA under the Commission's 
Order. 
This Court has found on several occasions that unless 
there is some uncertainty or ambiguity there is no basis for 
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interpretation or clarification of a certificate, because to go 
back of the language of the certificate and contradict its plain 
meaning would create intolerable confusion and uncertainty would 
exist with respect to the operating rights. See Peterson v. 
Public Service Commission, 1 Utah 2d, 324, 266 P.2d 497 (1954). 
If to go back of the plain language would create intolerable 
confusion and uncertainty with regard to operating rights, then 
certainly relying on the conduct of the regulated company involved 
since the issuance of those rights to interpret those rights 
would lead to the same intolerable confusion and uncertainty. 
Indeed, if one's conduct under an Order of the Commission were 
the basis for determining the meaning of the Order of the Commis-
sion, then economic regulation would be of no significance. We 
submit that the Commission's receipt of Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
and 12 and reliance thereon was error requiring reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that this Court must reverse the 
Order of the Public Service Commission or, in the alternative, 
declare so much of the Order as increases the operating rights of 
Dixie REA of no force and effect. If the Commission were without 
jurisdiction or authority to decide the issues in this matter, 
then its findings upon matters over which it had no jurisdiction 
to decide cannot stand. 
Further, we submit that the findings and conclusions of 
the Commission that Dixie REA has the right to serve customers 
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other than those existing customers it was serving on the effective 
date of the 1965 amendments to the Utah Public Utility Laws are, 
as a matter of law, erroneous and cannot stand. Section 54-4-
25(4) authorized the Commission to allow Dixie REA to continue to 
serve its existing customers if it was financially unfit. The 
Commission found Dixie REA to be unfit and by the clear meaning 
of its Order granted it the right to serve its existing customers. 
Section 54-4-25(4) requires that a financially unstable, nonprofit 
electric cooperative or electric corporation be frozen to their 
existing customers and the Commission's Order so froze Dixie. 
We further submit that the Commission's consideration 
of this matter was so tainted by its receipt and consideration of 
totally irrelevant and immaterial matters relating to the opera-
tion of Dixie* REA since the Commission's Order in 1966 that it 
must be reversed. 
DATED this / C ^ day of October, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^F. ROBERT REEDER 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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